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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE MEETS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE
COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE AS A
DEFENSE OF POTENTIAL REGIONAL
CARBON DIOXIDE REGULATION
Abstract: On December 20, 2005, seven northeastern states signed the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), an agreement aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas pollution from power plants. Once enacted by
each state's legislature or rulemaking agencies, this agreement will es-
tablish a "cap-and-trade" program to cap greenhouse gas emissions
within the region and allow power plants to trade emissions allocations.
This program faces a significant challenge, however. Electricity suppliers
within the region may import power from outside the regulated region
to avoid the constraints of the emissions cap, resulting in little or no net
decrease in overall emissions—a problem known as "leakage." Because
limiting emissions imports would inevitably place burdens on the inter-
state trade of electricity, the regulatory approaches available to RGGI
states to limit imports of power from unregulated regions may be sub-
ject to attack as violations of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. This Note explores the possibility of applying the concepts embod-
ied in the compensatory tax doctrine to defend a regulatory scheme
that the RGGI states might employ to combat leakage.
INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2005, seven northeastern states signed an
agreement to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
("RGGI") in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas pollution from power
plants.' This agreement marked the first formal commitment to
 im-
I See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding 12 (Dec. 20,
2005) [hereinafter RGGI MoUJ, available at littp://www.rggi.org/docs/mon_final_12_
20_05.pdf. Greenhouse gases arc those gases in the earth's atmosphere that contribute to the
"greenhouse effect"; that is, they absorb and reradiate energy from the sun back toward the
earth, causing the earth's surface and lower atmosphere to warm more than they otherwise
would. See C.C. LEE, DICTIONARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL TERMS 284 (1st ed. 1996); Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Terms of Environment: Glossary, Abbreviations, and Acro-
nyms, http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/gterms.html
 (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
Seven states are participating in the RGGI program: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. See RGGI MoU, supra, at 1, 6-7. The
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plementing a market-based trading program for carbon dioxide
("CO2 ") emissions in the United States.2 In March 2006, California's
Environmental Protection Agency released a report summarizing the
emissions trading program options that the state was exploring for
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. 3 Both the RGGI agreement and
the California report, however, identify a particular concern regard-
ing regional cap-and-trade emissions programs—that of "leakage."
Leakage—the movement of emissions from regulated to unregu-
lated regions to avoid caps on emissions—can occur when a cap-and-
trade scheme is implemented on a state or regional, rather than na-
tional, leve1.3 Electricity suppliers begin to import power from outside
the regulated region to avoid the constraints of the emissions cap, re-
sulting in little or no net decrease in overall emissions associated with
the power consumed inside the region.6 To combat this problem, the
RGGI states and California could limit emissions associated with en-
Memorandum of Understanding also contains an explicit provision allowing Massachusetts
and Rhode Island to become signatories at any time prior to January I, 2008, under cer-
tain conditions. See id. at 8.
I See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 1-2; ENV'T NE., THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RGGI PROGRAM AND ITS IMPORTANCE 3 (2005) [herein-
after ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW), http://www.env-neorg/Program%20Fact%20Sheets/ENE_
RGGI_Background.pdf. Market-based regulatory programs are commonly referred to as
cap-and-trade programs. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. These programs imple-
ment an aggregate cap on allowable emissions in a region through government regulation.
See infra note 25 and accompanying text. The cap is then distributed to polluters in the
form of allowances. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. Each polluter must own
enough allowances to cover its own emissions, but polluters are allowed to buy and sell
allowances among each other. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
5 See generally CAP AND TRADE SUBGROUP, CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAP AND TRADE
PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS (2006) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT], available at Imp://
www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006-03-27_CAP  AND_TRADE.
PDF. The Cap and Trade Subgroup's report was appended to the Climate Action Team's
more general report evaluating the impact of climate change on California and the op-
tions available to the state, which was presented to the California legislature and Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger. See CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM REPORT TO GOVERNOR SCIIWARZENEGGER AND THE LEGISLATURE 5
(2006), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006-
04-03_FINAL_CAT_REPORIPDF; see also Climate Action Team Reports to the Governor
and Legislature, http://www.climatechange.ca.goviclimate_action_team/reports/index.
html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (listing the Climate Action Team's reports and appendi-
ces). On August 30, 2006, California's leaders announced an agreement to enact legisla-
tion that would place sharp limits on carbon dioxide emissions within the state. See Felicity
Barringer, Officials Reach California Deal to Cut Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at Al.
4 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 9.
5 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
8 See id.
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ergy imported into the region.? Because limiting interstate imports
places burdens on the trade of electricity, however, this approach may
be subject to attack under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 8
This Note explores the possibility of applying the concepts em-
bodied in the compensatory tax doctrine to defend a regulatory
scheme that might be employed to combat leakage, focusing on RGGI
as the model scheme. 9 The compensatory tax doctrine stands for the
principle that even if a state regulation burdens interstate commerce,
it may survive constitutional scrutiny if it is a compensatory tax de-
signed merely to make interstate commerce bear a burden already
borne by intrastate commerce.° Any regulation the RGGI states adopt
to address leakage will necessarily impose burdens on interstate
commerce because they will have to limit, either directly or indirectly,
electricity imports from out of state." This Note argues that the RGGI
states, and any reviewing court, should draw on compensatory tax
doctrine principles in crafting, and supporting, a regulation that im-
poses burdens on imported electricity.' 2
Part I of this Note provides an introduction to the RGGI program
and the particular problem of leakage. 13 Part II introduces the poten-
tial legal challenges to the program based on the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, and explores the compensatory tax doctrine
as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court." Part III analyzes the appli-
cation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the compensatory tax
doctrine to the alternatives that RGGI may use to combat the problem
7 See Richard Cowart, Another Option for Power Sector Carbon Cap and Trade Systems—Allo-
cating to Load 3-4 (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2004), littp://www,rggi.org/docs/
allocating_to_load.pdf; see also CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-22.
8 See U.S. Coml.. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting authority to regulate interstate commerce to
the federal government); STACEY E. DAVIS, CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, POLICY OPTIONS
FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM POWER IMPORTS 20 (2005) thereinafter
PotAcv OvrtaNs], available at http://www.energ-y.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-600-2005-
010/CEC-600-2005-010-D.PDF (identifying differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state power as a potential Commerce Clause violation).
9 See infra notes 18-272 and accompanying text. The arguments in this Note could also
be applied to the regulatory scheme that California is currently adopting. See supra note 3.
I° See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325,331 (1996) (quoting Assoc. Indus. of Mo.
v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,647 (1994)); see also Walter Hellerstein, Complimentary Taxes as a
Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405,406 (1986) (examining
compensatory tax doctrine jurisprudence).
11 See infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 18-66 and accompanying text,
14 See infra notes 67-189 and accompanying text.
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of leakage and evaluates the likely success of those options." Part III
concludes that although the compensatory tax doctrine may not be
directly applicable to the regulation of emissions leakage, the legal
principles it embodies should be used to uphold the regulation. 16 In
addition, if RGGI can overcome the legal and political obstacles in its
path, it may serve as an effective experiment in the regulation of CO2
emissions and eventually could be a template for a national regulatory
program aimed at slowing global warming. 17
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
The states participating in RGGI are taking action because they
recognize that climate change poses serious risks to human health
and global ecosystems." Climate change is a result of global warming,
which in turn is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in
the earth's atmosphere, principally CO 2 . 19 Various scientific models
indicate that the average global temperature could rise by up to 7.7
degrees Fahrenheit by the middle of this century. 2° This expected
temperature increase could greatly exacerbate shortages of food, wa-
ter, and energy supplies, and increase the number of refugees around
the world—not to mention raise national security concerns relating to
15 See infra notes 190-272 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 190-272 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
19 See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 1.
19 See Eileen Claussen, An Effective Approach to Climate Change, SCIENCE, Oct. 29, 2004, at
816; Joint Science Academies' Statement: Global Response to Climate Change 1 ( June 7,
2005), http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf . Carbon dioxide is the most
abundant anthropogenic greenhouse gas in the world. ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2,
at 1. It is released into the atmosphere when carbon-based fuel is burned. See id. In 1780,
the level of CO2 in the earth's atmosphere was approximately 280 parts per million
("ppm") and had been for at least 6000 years. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man III:
What Can Be Done?, THE NEW YORKER, May 9, 2005, at 54. As the industrial age took hold,
CO2 concentrations began to rise—slowly at first and then more rapidly. See id. By the
1970s, the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere was approximately 330 ppm and in 2000
it reached 369 ppm. Id.; see also Lester R. Brown, Growing ... Growing . . . Gone?, MOTHER
EARTH NEWS, Dec. Jan. 2004, at 70, available at http://www.motherearthnews.com/Nature
_and_Environment/2003_December January/Growing Growing Gone_.
" See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man II: The Curse of Akkad, THE NEW YORKER,
May 2, 2005, at 69. This predicted increase in temperature is based on model predictions
that show that if we continue to produce greenhouse gases at the rates necessary to meet
increasing demand, atmospheric CO2 will reach 500 ppm around the middle of this cen-
tury. Id. There is evidence that CO2 concentrations in the earth's atmosphere were that
high about fifty million years ago when crocodiles lived in Colorado and ocean levels were
three hundred feet higher than they are today, putting much of today's inhabited land
underwater. Kolbert, supra note 19, at 54.
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nuclear proliferation, terrorism and the potential for war. 21 For this
reason, many countries, as well as state and local governments and
private economic entities in the United States, are taking action to
limit greenhouse gas emissions. 22
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Regulatory Structure
The purpose of the RGGI program is to regulate CO 2 emissions
using a market-based approach, commonly referred to as cap-and-
trade. 23 The cap-and-trade approach allows facilities subject to the
regulation to achieve emission reduction targets, and thus avoid po-
tential penalties, in an economically efficient manner. 24 Under the
2t See generally PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDAL/„ AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE SCE-
NARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY (2003), available at
hup://wwwenvironmentaldefense.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf  This
report, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense, identified these and other con-
sequences as the possible and even likely results of an abrupt climate change event that
could be caused by the collapse of the Atlantic conveyor as a result of global warming. See
id. at 1-3; see also RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 1.
22 See M.J. Bradley & Associates, Momentum Builds in the U.S.—What's Filling the Federal
Vacuum on Climate Change?, ENVTL. ENERGY INSIGHTS, Apr–May 2005, at 1-4. Through the
Kyoto Protocol, most of the countries in the world, including the United Kingdom, the
European Union nations, and Russia, have committed to reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions to at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 LL,M. 22 (1998); United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.p
df (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). On January 1, 2005, the European Union launched a cap-
and-trade program covering CO2 emissions from large industrial polluters that will eventu-
ally cover twenty-five countries with a target of reducing CO2 emissions to 8% below 1990
levels by 2012. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2005),
http://ec.ettropa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/emission_trading2_en.pdf;  see also Joseph
A. Kruger & William A. Pizer, Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: The New Grand Policy Experi-
ment, ENV'T, Oct. 2004, at 8-23 (analyzing the European Union emissions trading system).
Individual states, including New Hampshire, Massachusetts, California, Oregon, and Wash-
ington, have made commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. See M.J. Bradley & Associ-
ates, supra, at 2-3. Mayors from 132 U.S. cities have taken the Kyoto pledge of 7% reduc-
tions below 1990 levels by 2012, and fifty of the world's largest cities signed onto
greenhouse gas emission reductions of 25% by 2030 at the U.N. World Environment. Day
conference held in June 2005. Id. at 3-4. Additionally, in 2003, various institutional inves-
tors representing $2.7 trillion worth of assets formed the Investor Network on Climate Risk
to examine the risks of climate change to their portfolios. Id. at 1. The group called on
members to invest $1 billion in companies developing clean technologies and to adopt
standards for climate risk disclosure. Id. at 1-2. In 2005, JPMorgan Chase announced that
it would factor CO2 emissions into its lending practices. Id. at 2.
22 See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 2.
24
 See ENV'T NE. OVERV/EW, supra note 2, at 2. To ensure compliance with the cap, the
RGGI states will develop a method of enforcement that may be imposed on the regulated
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standard cap-and-trade model, the government sets an aggregate cap
on the amount of allowable emissions in the region. 25 The cap is then
distributed either through allocation or sale to each emitting facility
in the form of allowances, where one unit (usually a ton) of pollutant
equals one allowance.26 Each facility must own the same number of
allowances as the number of tons of pollutant it emits.° The current
proposal is to implement the RGGI cap in two phases. 28 Between the
years 2009 and 2015, the RGGI states will cap CO 2 emissions at ap-
proximately 120 million tons, which is approximately equivalent to
the average emissions of the highest three years between 2000 and
2004. 29 In the second phase the cap will be reduced by 10% from 2015
through 2020."
The cap-and-trade approach creates a market for the allowances
when a cleaner power facility has more allowances than it needs to
cover its emissions. 31 The cleaner facility can then sell its surplus al-
lowances to dirtier facilities that do not have enough allowances to
cover their emissions. 32 If the demand for allowances increases, the
market price for allowances also will increase. 33 Dirtier facilities then
face the choice of either reducing emissions or purchasing allowances
facilities. See MODEL RULE § XX-6.5 (Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2006), http://www.
rggi.org/docs/niodel_rule_8_15_06.pdf (setting out a model compliance scheme).
25 See ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 2; OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOOLS OF TILE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 1-2 (2003) [hereinafter EPA Gunn],
available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/international/tools.pdf.
26 See ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 2; EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 1-2.
27 See ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 2; EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 1-2.
28 Memorandum from the RGGI Staff Working Group to RGGI Agency Heads 2 (Aug.
24, 2005) [hereinafter RGGI Staff Memorandum], http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_pro
posal_8_24_05.pdf.
29 See id.; see also RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 2. If Massachusetts and Rhode Island join
the program, the cap will be increased to approximately 150 million tons. See RGGI MoU,
supra note 1, at 8.
so RGGI Staff Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2.
31 See EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 1-2 to -3.
32 See id. Cap-and-trade is a workable solution in the case of CO2 because CO2 is a uni-
form pollutant; it has the same atmospheric impact regardless of where the source is lo-
cated. See ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 2. By contrast, localized pollutants such as
mercury and particulate matter directly impact the health of the local communities and
ecosystems surrounding the emission source, Id. This localized impact raises concerns over
the creation of "hotspots" of pollution and related social and environmenutl justice issues.
See EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 2-2. Therefore, for localized pollutants it is usually neces-
sary to implement site-specific command-and-control regulation, which does nut allow the
flexibility of cap-and-trade programs. See id.
33 See EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 1-2 to -4.
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because the net emissions from the region cannot exceed the cap. 34
This approach gives facilities flexibility not available to them tinder
traditional command and control regulations; each facility can design
its own compliance strategy based on economic efficiency and adjust
its strategy over time in response to changes in technology and the
market." In fact, the federal government used a cap-and-trade pro-
gram to regulate the emissions that cause acid rain largely because of
the flexibility the approach offers. 36
Because the federal government has not implemented a national
regulatory program for CO 2 emissions, the northeastern states,
through RGGI, may act without fear of preemption by existing federal
law.37
 This does not mean, however, that RGGI lacks legal obstacles."
For example, although each state has the individual authority to regu-
late CO2 emissions, each must determine how to fit that regulation
within its state regulatory framework." Some states can adopt the
RGGI regulations through the rulemaking authority vested in their
94 See id. at 1-2 to -3. Dirtier facilities that exceed the emissions cap may be subject to
additional penalties. See supra note 24.
33 See EPA GUIDE, supra note 25, at 1-2. In addition to investing in non-emitting forms
of energy generation such as wind and solar energy, regulated facilities will have an incen-
tive to improve end-use efficiency, transition to cleaner fossil fuels, invest in more efficient
generation and transmission technology, and even utilize carbon capture and sequestra-
tion techniques to offset their emissions if it is economically efficient to do so. See id. at 1-3;
see also CA LIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2000) (aiming to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide and ni-
trogen oxide through an emissions allocation and transfer system); see also CALIFORNIA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-12 (noting the success of the federal government's acid rain
reduction program). The largest-scale use of the cap-and-trade model in the United States
to date is the federal government's acid rain program under Title IV of the Clean Air Act,
but the model has also been used in regional programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000); CALI-
FORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-15. Two regional programs, the Northeast NOx
Budget Program and the Regional Clean 'Air Incentives Program ("RECLAIM"), used a
cap-and-trade emissions program to regulate ozone and smog, respectively, with varying
degrees of scope and success. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
37 See ENV'T NE. OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 3. This statement assumes that RGGI does
not attempt to regulate electricity transmission or wholesale transactions per se that are
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the Federal Power Act. See
16 U.S.C. § 824 (2000); see also Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Green-
house Gas Emissions, 119 I-I.Attv. L. Ray. 1877, 1878 (2006) (arguing that state regulation of
greenhouse gases should not be preempted by the federal foreign affairs power).
36 See Peter Glaser, Troutman Sanders LLP, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Con-
trarian Perspective, Presentation to the American Bar Association's Environment, Energy and
Resources Section 23 ( Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/renew
ableenergy/teleconarchives/012606/1-26-06GlaserPPTPPT (contending that the RGGI
states face Compact Clause and Commerce Clause hurdles and questioning whether the
states have the political will to regulate CO2if legislation is required).
" See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 7.
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respective state agencies, while others require enabling legislation to
give effect to the RGGI rules.40 Once the cap-and-trade regulations
have been adopted, each RGGI state will monitor and enforce those
rules.'" That enforcement may raise additional challenges—in par-
ticular, the problem of leakage. 42
B. The Problem of Leakage and Regulations That Burden. Interstate Commerce
Implementing a cap-and-trade program at the regional level pre-
sents problems that do not arise when a similar program is imple-
mented at the national level. 45 The RGGI cap-and-trade program will
operate on the supply side—that is, CO 2 emission allowances will be
allocated to, and traded among, fossil fuel-fired electricity generators
within the region that supply electricity to the grid." Because the
emissions cap will apply only to in-region generators, the RGGI plan
will not limit emissions from electricity that is imported into the re-
gion and used by consumers within RGGI states. 45 Generators outside
the capped region will be able to export power freely to the entities
inside the region that are responsible for procuring and delivering
electric power to consumers without concern for the cap—resulting
in emissions leakage.46 Entities that deliver electricity to the consumer
are referred to as load-serving entities ("LSEs"). 47
4° See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 9.
45 See POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 4-5,8 (discussing problems of regulatory pro-
grams that do not cap emissions outside the regulating state, including the problem of
leakage); ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & STEPHEN C. FOTIS, PEW GTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, ANALYSIS OF EARLY ACTION CREDITING PROPOSALS 31 (1998), http://www.
pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentID=237 (identifying displacement of emissions
from sources within the program to sources outside the program as a potential problem
facing non-national programs).
" See RGGI Mull, supra note 1, at 2; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI,
http://wwwrggi.org/about.larn (last visited Aug. 23, 2006); supra notes 23-27 and accom-
panying text.
45 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
46 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5. The pro-
gram cap will cover all in-region fossil fuel-fired electricity-generating units having a rated
capacity equal to or greater than twenty-five megawatts. See RGGI Mot!, supra note 1, at 2.
The program may be expanded in the future to include other sources of greenhouse gas
emissions and greenhouse gases other than CO2. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.hun (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
47 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21; Cowart, supra note 7, at 2.
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The leakage problem presents two related problems for regula-
tors in the RGGI region." First, generators outside the RGGI region
will have a competitive advantage over generators within the region
because they will have little incentive to invest in the cleaner tech-
nologies required to achieve the emission cap." As a result, electricity
outside the region will become less expensive than electricity pro-
duced inside the region." This leads to the second problem.51 The
resulting increase in cheaper, imported electricity will undermine the
goal of the program because imported emissions will not count to-
wards the region's emission limits even though they are directly asso-
ciated with the region's electricity consumption."
As expressed in their Memorandum of Understanding, the RGGI
states already are committed to a supply side cap-and-trade program."
During the initial phase of the program, the RGGI states have decided
not to take direct regulatory action to stem leakage, but have agreed
to implement measures to monitor electricity imports and reevaluate
whether action is required at a later date." In the meantime, the
RGGI states will establish a working group to consider potential op-
tions for addressing leakage. 55
Various options are available to address the problem of leakage. 56
One option is to supplement the initial domestic cap-and-trade pro-
gram (imposed on in-state electricity generators as a source of emis-
sions) with a second, load-side cap-and-trade regulation imposed on
48 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
49 See CAUFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
50 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
51 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
52 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
55 See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 2.
51
 See id. at 9.
66 Id.
66 See CALIFORNIA REI 'oRT, supra note 3, at 22-24; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5. For ex-
ample, California is exploring a variation of the cap-and-trade approach referred to as
allocation-to-load. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. Under this approach emission
allowances are allocated to electricity providers, or LSEs, rather than to electricity genera-
tors. Id. Each LSE must hold allowances equal to the emissions created by the electricity it
distributes to consumers. Id. Under a complete allocation-to-load program, the regulated
LSE must hold allowances for all emissions associated with the electricity it sells to con-
sumers, regardless of where the producing generator is located, and the cap applies to
total emissions associated with all electricity consumed in the state. Id. In this way, im-
ported energy, as well as domestic energy, is accounted for in the cap. See CALIFORNIA RE-
rowr, supra note 3, at 21-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
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LSEs, but only on the electricity they import into the region. 57 This
load-side regulation would treat electricity imports as an additional
source of emissions included in the CO2 emissions cap for the re-
gion." LSEs would initially be allocated CO 2 allowances on the same
basis as that of in-region generators—LSEs would receive allocations
based on historic imports just as generators receive allocations to
cover their historic generation. 59 In-state generators would be legally
responsible for their own emissions under the first regulation.6° Un-
der the second regulation, LSEs would be legally responsible for the
emissions associated with the electricity they import from states out-
side the RGGI region and distribute to in-state consumers. 61 The total
cap on CO2 emissions would therefore cover those emissions pro-
duced in the region by electricity generators, as well as those emis-
sions produced outside the region that are directly associated with
consumer demand for electricity inside the region. 62 The LSEs would
engage in the same market for allowances with electricity generators
and make operating choices based on economic efficiency."
This regulatory scheme would likely face challenges based on the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, however, be-
cause the regulation imposed on LSEs would place restrictions only
57 Cf. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23 (discussing the possibility of regulat-
ing CO2 emissions through LSEs, rather than generators). This Note does not address the
question of whether individual states have the authority to regulate the emissions associ-
ated with imported power purchased by regulated LSEs. See id. (discussing existing regula-
tory authority and additional authority that would require legislative action to regulate all
LSEs in California). This question depends heavily on state-specific legal issues. See Id.; see
also RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 7.
58 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
" See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5. The cur-
rent proposed cap for the total RGGI region—approximately 120 million short tons—is
based on the average emissions of the highest three years between 2000 and 2004 for each
state. See RGGI MoU, supra note 1, at 2; RGGI Staff Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2.
Generators and LSEs alike would receive allowances on this same historic basis. See CALI-
FORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
6° See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
61 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. The assignment of CO2 attributes to
imported electricity for the purposes of measuring emissions associated with consumption
in the state is a complicated issue that is not addressed in this Note. See id. at 23. Several
methods are available. See id. Before choosing a method, the regulating community must
consider the impact that each method could have on the legal analysis presented herein.
See id.
62 See id. at 21-23.
63 See id.
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on imported electricity.° Electricity generators outside the RGGI re-
gion wishing to sell into the region at lower prices likely will challenge
the regulation as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, which
prohibits any state from enacting regulations that discriminate against
(or place burdens on) interstate commerce. 65 The RGGI states should
thoroughly consider potential Commerce Clause challenges before
implementing a cap-and-trade program on electricity imported by
LSEs to stem leakage.66
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
"the Congress shall have Power . , to regulate commerce ... among
the several States."67 Although phrased as an affirmative grant of
power to Congress, the Commerce Clause has long been recognized
to have a negative aspect which denies states the power to discrimi-
nate against, or burden, interstate commerce.° A variety of reasons
are given for this negative aspect of the Commerce Clause (called the
"dormant Commerce Clause"); two are of particular interest here.°
First, it prohibits economic protectionism by the states—that is, regu-
latory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors. 7° Second, it promotes economic
64 See U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (holding that state laws placing burdens on interstate commerce are
subject to challenge based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Robert B.
McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Lead-
ership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. Ray. 15, 07 (2004) (noting potential Commerce Clause challenges to state and
regional regulatory programs).
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; McKinstry, supra note 64, at
67.
66 See infra notes 190-272 and accompanying text; see also Kirsten 1 1. Engel, The Dor-
mant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity
Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 250-52 (1999) (noting the Commerce Clause objec-
tions to market-based environmental regulation and arguing that such regulation should
be upheld based on the logic of the market participant exception and because it promotes
economic efficiency and interstate harmony, and is not motivated by economic protection-
ism).
67 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
68 See Fulton Corp. V. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1994).
" See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 330; Ox Waste, 511 U.S. at 98-99.
7° Fulton, 516 U.S. at 330 (quoting Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647
(1994)).
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efficiency that would be undone if states were free to place burdens
on the flow of commerce across their borders.n The Supreme Court
has stated that in granting Congress authority over interstate com-
merce, the Framers sought "to avoid tendencies toward the economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the colonies and
later among the states under the Articles of Confederation.""
The first step in evaluating the constitutionality of a state law un-
der dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to determine
whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "in-
cidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against in-
terstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect." Where the
regulation is "evenhanded" and the effects are "incidental," the stat-
ute will be upheld if the regulation passes the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
balancing test. 74 This test examines whether: (l) the law effectuates a
legitimate local purpose, (2) the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,
and (3) there are alternative means for promoting the local purpose
as well without discriminating against interstate commerce." Where,
however, the state regulation is discriminatory, meaning that it pro-
vides differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests, it is
virtually per se invalid." The regulation's proponent will only over-
come the per se rule of invalidity if it can show that the regulation
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." Facial discrimination
by itself may be a fatal defect, and invokes the strictest scrutiny of any
purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondis-
criminatory alternatives."
71 See On Waste, 511 U.S. at 98-99.
72 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
" See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
74 See 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
75 See id.
76 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 99.
77 See Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988)); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-
52 (1986) (upholding a facially discriminatory law banning the importation of out-of-state
bait fish into Maine because the fish were subject to parasites completely foreign to Maine
Widish and could jeopardize the health of the Maine fish population, and no nondis• .
criminatory alternatives existed).
76 See OK Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337; see also Justin M. Nesbit, Note,
Commerce Clause Implications of Massachusetts' Attempt to Limit the Importation of 'Dirty" Power in
the Looming Competitive Retail Market for Electricity Generation, 38 B.C. L. Rs:v. 811, 842 (1997)
(concluding that an outright ban on imported power would likely be invalidated under the
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The hybrid regulatory approach described above could be chal-
lenged as a facially discriminatory regulation because the regulation
covering LSEs only regulates emissions associated with imported elec-
tricity and therefore expressly treats in-state and out-of-state interests
differently." The LSE regulation imposes burdens on electricity cross-
ing state lines only.8° Therefore it burdens out-of-state generators wish-
ing to sell into the RGGI region, but does not itself impose the same
burdens on in-state generators." Thus, the regulation would most likely
be subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. 82
A. An Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule of Invalidity:
The Compensatory Tax Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to
the per se rule of invalidity for facially discriminatory regulations, in
the form of the compensatory tax doctrine." Under the compensa-
tory tax doctrine, a facially discriminatory regulation may survive
strict scrutiny if it is a compensatory tax designed merely to make in-
terstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate com-
merce." Although often expressed as an independent doctrine unto
itself, the compensatory tax doctrine is merely a specific way of justify-
ing a facially discriminatory tax because it achieves a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means. 85
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the compensatory
tax doctrine in the 1869 case of Hinson v. Lott. 86 In Hinson, the state of
Alabama imposed a tax on all liquor imported into the state equal to
the tax imposed on all liquor distilled within the state S 7 The Supreme
Court stated that the tax on imported liquor was merely a comple-
mentary provision necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors sold
Commerce Clause but that a surcharge on sales of "dirty" electricity could pass the Pike
balancing test).
79 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 99.
9° See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text; see also Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (finding that wholesale tax imposed only on imported goods bur-
dened interstate commerce).
HI See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
82 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 99.
83 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 102,
64 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331 (quoting Lohman, 511 U.S. at 647).
" See Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 102.
" See 75 U.S. 148, 153 (1869).
57 Id. at 150.
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in the state. 88 Therefore, the Court held that this was not an attempt
to regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate exercise of
the state's taxing power.88
Since Hinson, the Court has more clearly defined and
significantly limited the compensatory tax doctrine through a line of
cases beginning in 1937 with Henneford v. Silas Mason and culminating
in the decision of Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner in 1996.8° Modern applica-
tion of the compensatory tax doctrine involves a three-part test set out
in 1994 in Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality of
the State of Oregon and refined in Fulton Carp.81 The three conditions
necessary for a valid compensatory tax are: (1) a state must identify
the intrastate burden for which the state is attempting to compensate;
(2) the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to ap-
proximate—but not to exceed—the amount of the tax on intrastate
commerce; and (3) the events on which the interstate and intrastate
taxes are imposed must be substantially equivalent—that is, they must
be substantially similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive
proxies for each other.92 Given the relatively short life and limited ap-
plication of the formalized three-part test, it is necessary to examine
earlier cases, which address each of the prongs only implicitly, to ana-
lyze the compensatory tax doctrine fully."
B. The History of the Compensatory Tax Doctrine
1. Henneford v. Silas Mason: Formal Validation of the Compensatory
Tax
Nearly seventy years after its decision in Hinson, the Supreme
Court formally recognized the validity of a "compensating tax" in
1937 in Henneford v. Silas Mason." In Silas Mason, the State of Wash-
ington imposed two taxes, a 2% tax on retail sales and a compensating
2% tax on the privilege to use any article of tangible personal prop-
erty within the state.95 The use tax did not apply to articles for which a
88 Id. at 153.
99 Id.
° See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332. See generally Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577
(1937).
91 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332-33; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 103.
92 See Fulton, 516 U.S, at 332-33.
95 See infra notes 94-189 and accompanying text.
" See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 583-84; Hinson, 75 U.S. at 152-53.
95 Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 579.
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tax equal to or greater than 2% had already been applied out-of-
state. 96
 The plaintiffs in Silas Mason brought machinery, materials and
supplies into Washington that were purchased at retail in other states
for use on the construction of a dam on the Columbia River. 97 Wash-
ington assessed a use tax on the items because they had not been sub-
ject to a sales tax out of state."
The Court first acknowledged that the regulatory scheme was
discriminatory on its face; the tax would never be payable on items
purchased within the State of Washington because those items would
be subject to a sales tax 99 The burden of paying the use tax, however,
was imposed equally on residents and non-residents who used their
property within the state.'" The Court noted that when the account
was made up, the stranger from afar was subject to no greater burdens
as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates.'°'
The Court reasoned that while one paid upon one activity or incident,
and the other upon another, the sum was the same. 162 This reasoning
implied that the sale and use of articles within the state were substan-
tially similar events because the burdens fell on similarly described
people—those taxpayers using articles in the state—and the taxes
were therefore functionally equivalent.'" The Court concluded that
the scheme was not an unlawful burden on interstate commerce be-
cause it did not in fact burden commerce; it did not place a greater
burden on goods purchased outside the state than those purchased
inside the state.'" The Court also rejected the proposition that the
scheme amounted to protectionism of local retailers. 10' Because the
tax was imposed on use, rather than import of the goods, and there
was equality in the laying of the tax, there was no protectionism.'"
96 Id. at 580-81.
97 Id. at 579.
" Id.
99 See id. at 581.
to See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 583-84.
191 Id. at 584.
192 Id.
I" See id. at 584-85. This reasoning also implied that the State of Washington had a le-
gitimate sovereign interest in taxing the use of property within the state once commerce
was at an end. See id. at 582.
l" See id. at 584-85.
1 °9 Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 586-87.
196 See id.
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2. Maryland v. Louisiana: Rejection of the "First-Use" Tax
Since the Supreme Court's validation of the compensatory use
tax in Silas Mason, it has steadfastly refused to apply the compensatory
tax doctrine to areas outside the realm of sales and use taxes. 107 For
example, in its 1981 decision in Maryland v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court struck down a Louisiana "first use" tax imposed on any natural
gas imported into the state that was not subject to taxation by another
state. 108 In effect this tax meant that only gas from the outer continen-
tal shelf (the "OCS")—an area of ocean that lies beyond state, but
within federal, boundaries—was subject to the tax. 109 The tax imposed
was equal to the severance tax the state imposed on gas producers in
the state."° Because of numerous tax exemptions and credits, how-
ever, the net effect of the tax scheme was to tax OCS gas moving
through and eventually out of the state but not to tax Louisiana con-
sumers of OCS gas."
As an initial matter, the Court addressed the State of Louisiana's
claim that the taxable "uses" within the state broke the flow of com-
merce and were wholly local events, subject to state regulation. 112 The
Court rejected this reasoning, stating that gas crossing a state line at
any stage of its movement to the ultimate consumer was in interstate
commerce during the entire journey from the wellhead to the con-
sumer, even though interrupted by certain events within a particular
state.'"
Finding the tax scheme facially discriminatory towards interstate
commerce, the Court set out to determine whether it could be up-
held as a compensatory tax under Silas Mason."4 The Court held that
the compensatory tax doctrine requires identification of the burden
for which the state is attempting to compensate." 6 Louisiana claimed
that it was attempting to compensate for the burden of the severance
tax on local production of natural ga.s." 6 The Court rejected this ar-
101 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342 (noting that the court has consistently declined to extend
the compensatory exception beyond sales and use taxes); see also Oa Waste, 511 U.S. at 105;
Armco, 467 U.S. at 644; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981).
109 451 U.S. at 731, 760.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 733.
112 Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 754-55.
113 Id. at 755-56.
1 " See id. at 756, 758.
115 Id. at 758.
116
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gument, stating that although Louisiana has an interest in protecting
its natural resources and therefore could impose a severance tax on
domestic producers, it had no comparable sovereign interest in being
compensated for the severance of resources from land outside its
boundaries." 7 Therefore, the first-use tax could not have been de-
signed to meet the same ends as the severance tax—it could not have
been designed to protect Louisiana's natural resources. 118 The Court
said that the "use" of gas and severance of gas could not be consid-
ered "substantially equivalent events," reasoning implicitly that be-
cause the burden of the two taxes fell on differently described taxpay-
ers (in-state producers and out-of-state consumers) and did not meet
the same ends, the taxes were not functionally equivalent." 8 The
Court differentiated these circumstances from the case of sales and
use taxes, where a state attempts to ensure uniform treatment of
goods to be consumed in the state by imposing taxes on substantially
similar events occurring wholly within the state.'"
The Court concluded that the common thread running through
the cases upholding compensatory taxes was equality of treatment be-
tween local and interstate commerce.'" Because the pattern of credits
and exemptions principally burdened gas moving out of state, the tax
was not a valid compensatory tax. 122
3. Armco, Inc. u Hardesty: An Emphasis on Substantially Equivalent
Events
The Supreme Court zeroed in on the notion of substantially
equivalent events in 1984 in Armco v. Hardesty.'" In that case the Court
struck down a tax imposed by West Virginia on gross receipts of tan-
gible property sold at wholesale.'" The Court found the regulation to
be facially discriminatory because it exempted local manufacturers
from the tax. 125 West Virginia defended the tax, which was 0.27% of
the wholesale price, as a compensatory tax for the far higher 0.88%






122 See Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759-60.
123 See 467 U.S. at 643,
124 Id. at 640, 646.
125 See id, at 642.
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manufacturing tax on local manufacturers.'26 The Court rejected the
argument, holding that manufacturing and wholesale were not sub-
stantially similar events. 127 The Court noted that the manufacturing
tax was not reduced when the goods were sold out of state, providing
evidence that the tax was in fact a manufacturing tax and not a proxy
for the gross receipts tax imposed on wholesalers from out of state. 128
In addition, the Court found that it would be impossible to determine
which portion of the manufacturing tax was attributable to manufac-
turing and which portion to sales, and therefore it would be impossi-
ble to do an accounting to determine whether the tax on intrastate
commerce roughly approximated the alleged compensating tax on
interstate commerce. 129
The Court also noted that when the two taxes were considered
together, discrimination against interstate commerce persisted be-
cause there was no exception in the wholesale tax regulation for
manufacturers who had already paid a manufacturing tax in their
home state.m If the scheme were upheld, manufacturers from out of
state would pay both a manufacturing tax and a wholesale tax, while a
West Virginia resident would pay only a manufacturing tax."' The
Court indicated that this would clearly violate the anti-protectionist
purposes of the Commerce Clause. 132
C. The Modern Compensatory Tax Doctrine and the Three-Part Test
1. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the
State of Oregon: The Three-Part Test Established
The Supreme Court set out the three elements of the compensa-
tory tax doctrine distinctly for the first time in 1994 in Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the State of Ore-
gon.'" In that case, an Oregon-based solid waste disposal company
challenged an Oregon regulation that imposed a $2.25-per-ton sur-
charge on out-of-state waste disposed of at landfills within Oregon.'
126 See id.
121 Id. at 643.
1 " Armco, 467 U.S. at 643.
1" Id.
13° Id. at 644.
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 See On Waste, 511 U.S. at 103.
134 Id. at 96-97.
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The Oregon-based company regularly shipped waste from neighbor-
ing Washington into Oregon for disposal. 135 The Oregon Supreme
Court upheld the surcharge as a compensatory fee with an express
nexus to actual costs incurred by state and local governments associ-
ated with disposing of the waste. 136 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and invalidated the surcharge,'"
The Court held that because the rule was facially discriminatory,
it was per se invalid unless it advanced a legitimate local purpose that
could not be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory al-
ternatives)" The Court began by recognizing the settled principle
that interstate commerce may be made to "pay its way" and that "[lit
was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged
in interstate commerce from their just share of state . burdens."'"
The Court noted that since Hinson v. Lott in 1869 the compensatory
tax doctrine had been used to express these principles, while also en-
suring that no state exacts more than a just share from interstate
commerce, which is a central purpose of the Commerce Clause.' 4°
The Court set out the first and second prongs of the compensatory
tax analysis requiring the state to (1) identify the intrastate burden for
which the state is attempting to compensate and (2) show that the bur-
den on interstate commerce roughly approximated, but did not ex-
ceed, the burden on intrastate commerce. 141 Applying these two re-
quirements, the Court held that Oregon's failure to identify a specific
compensating charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding
the surcharge was fatal to its claim) 42 Oregon claimed that the sur-
charge compensated for general taxes paid by Oregon residents who
disposed of in-state waste. 143 The Court rejected this claim because it
was impossible to determine which portion of the general taxes were
attributable to the disposal of waste, and therefore the Court could not
determine whether the two burdens were roughly equivalent)" Ac-
cordingly, the state failed the first two prongs of the analysis. 146
185 Id. at 97.
iss
I" Id. at 98.
in Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 99.
139 Id. at 102 (citations omitted); see also Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 753.
14° See Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 102.
See id. at 103.
142 Id. at 104.
14s Id.
"4 See id.
145 See Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 104.
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The Court further stated that even if it were possible to calculate
the portion of the general taxes that contributed to an intrastate bur-
den roughly equivalent to the interstate burden, the surcharge would
still be invalid because the general tax and the surcharge were not
imposed on substantially equivalent events. 146 Thus, the surcharge
also violated the third prong of the analysis. 1 g 7 Under the "equivalent
events" analysis, the Court reasoned that earning income and dispos-
ing of waste were even less equivalent than wholesale and manufactur-
ing, which were found not to be substantially equivalent in Artno. 148
The court reasoned implicitly that the two taxes were not designed to
meet the same ends, because income taxes cover far more than dis-
posal of waste and the two could not be functionally equivalent to
each other. 149 Moreover, the fact that Oregon-based shippers of out-of-
state waste were charged the surcharge and income tax refuted the
argument that the events were substantially (or functionally) equiva-
lent. 15° The Court noted that the prototypical example of substantially
equivalent events is the sale and use of articles within the state and
that the only compensatory taxes upheld had been use taxes on
products purchased out of state. 151 The Court refused to weigh com-
parative burdens imposed on dissimilar events. 152
2. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner. The Modern Test Summarized
The modern embodiment of the compensatory tax doctrine was
summarized most recently in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner in 1996. 153 The
case involved an "intangibles tax" on the fair market value of corpo-
rate stock owned by North Carolina residents. 154 Residents were enti-
tled to take a deduction equal to the fraction of the issuing corpora-
tion's income that was subject to tax in North Carolina. 155 Therefore,
if a resident owned stock in an in-state corporation the stock was not
subject to the tax because the taxable percentage deduction was
100%, but stock in an out-of-state corporation was subject to the
146 See id.
147 See id. at 103.
145 See id. at 105; Armco, 967 U.S. at 643.
149 See On Waste, 511 U.S. at 104-05.
15° See id. at 105.
151 Id.
1 " See id.
155 See 516 U.S. at 332-33.
154 Id. at 327.
155 /d. at 327-28.
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tax. 156 Therefore, the Court first determined that the regulatory
scheme was facially discriminatory. 157
The Supreme Court again recognized that there may be cases
where a facially discriminatory tax may be upheld if the combined ef-
fect of the multi-tax scheme is to subject intrastate and interstate com-
merce to equivalent burdens. 158 The Court then reiterated the three
conditions necessary for a valid compensatory tax: (1) a state must
identify the intrastate burden for which the state is attempting to com-
pensate; (2) the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to
approximate—but not to exceed—the amount of the tax on intrastate
commerce; and (3) the events on which the interstate and intrastate
taxes are imposed must be so substantially similar in substance as to
serve as mutually exclusive proxies for each other. 159
To meet its burden under the first prong, North Carolina argued
that the taxable percentage deduction (i.e. the tax on out-of-state
stock interests) compensated for theburden of the general corporate
income tax paid by corporations doing business in North Carolina.'°
The Court rejected this argument, holding that in addition to merely
identifying the intrastate burden for which it seeks to compensate, the
state must also show that the intrastate tax serves some purpose for
which the state may otherwise impose a burden on interstate com-
merce. 161 The Court held that because North Carolina had no general
sovereign interest in taxing income earned out of state, it would fail
the first prong of the analysis unless the state could identify some in-
state activity or benefit to justify the compensatory tax. 162 North Caro-
lina attempted to cure this deficiency by pointing out that the out-of-
state corporations benefited from the use of the state's capital markets
without paying corporate income tax and that the intangible tax
compensated for this loss.'" The Court declined to create a prece-
dent that would allow the imposition of a tax on entities involved in
interstate commerce any time they happened to use facilities sup-
ported by general state tax funds. 164
156 Id. at 328.
157 Id. at 333.
158 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331.
159 Id. at 332-33.
160 See id. at 334.
161 See id.
162 Id.
10 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 339-35.
104 See id. at 335.
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Under the second prong of the analysis, the Court in Fulton ad-
dressed the problem of interstate burdens that are imposed as a com-
pensatory measure for generally defined intrastate burdens. 165 The
second prong requires that the burden on interstate commerce be
shown roughly to approximate, but not exceed, the amount of the bur-
den on intrastate commerce.' North Carolina justified the intangibles
tax and corresponding taxable percentage deduction as a measure for
maintenance of the capital market for the shares of both foreign and
domestic corporations. 167 The Court noted that the tax for which the
state purported to compensate was a general corporate income tax that
paid for a wide range of things, including construction and mainte-
nance of a transportation network, institutions to educate a workforce,
and local fire and police protection.'68 The state could not say what
percentage of that general tax was allocated to support the capital mar-
ket and whether that proportion was greater or smaller than the one
imposed on interstate commerce by the intangibles tax.169 The Court
emphasized the point made in Oregon Waste, namely that it is generally
unwilling to make the complex quantitative assessments required by
the compensatory tax doctrine when general forms of taxation are in-
volved.'" The Court confirmed its unwillingness to permit discrimina-
tory taxes on interstate commerce to compensate for charges purport-
edly included in general forms of intrastate taxation. 171
In addressing the third prong of the analysis, the Court noted
that recent decisions expressed an extreme reluctance to recognize
new compensatory categories outside the sales/use tax combination
recognized in Silas Mason. 172 The third prong requires that the com-
pensating burdens fall on "substantially equivalent events."'" The
Court explained that to meet this requirement the taxed activities
must be sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive
proxies for each other and that the two taxes must be functionally
equivalent. 174 The Court held that actual incidence of the tax upon
the same class of taxpayers is a necessary precondition for a valid
165 See id. at 337-38.
166 Id. at 336.
167 See id. at 338.
168 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 337.
169 Id. at 338.
17° See id. (citing Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 105 n.8).
171 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338 (quoting Or: Waste, 511 U.S. at 105 n.8).
172 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 339 (quoting Or: Waste, 511 U.S. at 103).
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compensatory tax, reasoning that if the burden falls on differently
described entities then the taxes cannot be functionally equivalent.'"
The Court recognized that the ultimate distribution of burdens may
be different from the statutory distribution of burdens, particularly
when the nominal taxpayer can pass the burden to other parties, such
as consumers. 176 The Court held that a state defending a compensa-
tory tax scheme has the burden of showing that, at a minimum, the
actual incidence of the two burdens is such that the real taxpayers are
within the same class, so that a finding of combined neutrality as to
interstate commerce is at least possible.'"
North Carolina argued that because corporate earnings influence
the price of stock, the intangibles tax and the income tax are essentially
taxing the same event. 178 The Court held that this was insufficient, and
that the difference between the parties on which the taxes fell was of
great significance. 179 The Court noted that in Silas Mason, the use tax
was acceptable because the effect of the regulatory regime was to help
in-state retailers to compete on terms of equality with retailers in other
states who are exempt from a sales tax or other corresponding bur-
den.'" In Silas Mason, all taxpayers using their property within the state
bore an equal burden whether paying a use tax or a sales tax. 181 This
equality did not exist in Fulton because the allegedly compensating
taxes fell on taxpayers who were differently described.'" The income
tax paid by corporations doing business in the state would be reflected
in the stock price, and the actual burden of the tax would be borne by
other parties such as consumers of the corporations' products.' 83 By
contrast, the Court stated, it was unlikely that the stock price of corpo-
rations doing business outside the state would reflect the impact of the
incidence tax because North Carolina investors make up a small por-
176 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 340.
176 Id. at 341.
177 1d. at 340. The Court noted that a finding that the burden falls on the same class of
taxpayers is a condition precedent for a finding that the two taxes are complementary, and
declined to decide whether mere incidence is sufficient to compel the conclusion that the
two burdens fall on substantially equivalent events. Id. at 340 n.6 (citing Armco, 467 U.S. at
643).
178
 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 339.
179 Id. at 340.
180 See id. at 340 (citing Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 581).
181 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 340.
182 See id.
188 See id. at 343.
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tion of the national market.'" Thus, the economic incidence of that tax
would fall on the resident shareholder.'"
The Court noted that the objective of the "equivalent event" re-
quirement is to enable in-state and out-of-state businesses to compete
on equal footing.'" The combination of the two tax schemes violated
this objective because the actual incidence of the intangibles tax fell
squarely on the shareholder and thus encouraged North Carolina in-
vestors to favor investment in corporations doing business within the
state. 187 The Court stated that the compensatory tax doctrine is fun-
damentally concerned with equalizing competition between in-staters
and out-of-staters.'" The Court cautioned, however, that the difficulty
in comparing the economic incidence of allegedly complementary
tax schemes on different taxpayers and different transactions leads to
the conclusion that courts will be unable to evaluate equivalency out-
side the context of traditional sales/use taxes.'"
III. APPLYING COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE TO THE
PROBLEM OF LEAKAGE
Although addressing climate change at the state and regional
levels is certainly suboptimal, it could eventually have important ef-
fects on national policy.'" Individual state actions create a patchwork
of policies around the country that is both inefficient for businesses
and risky for the acting states, which risk driving business out of
state. 191 This patchwork, however, often inspires the regulated com-
munity to lobby the federal government for national action. 192 In ad-
dition, states can serve as laboratories for experimenting with various
regulatory options to determine the best model for national action.'"
184 Id.
185
186 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 340.
187 See id. at 343.
168 See id. at 342 n.8.
189 See id.
190 M.J. Bradley & Associates, supra note 22, at 2.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 4.
193 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebniann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (°rhere must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experimen-
tation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs."); see also McKinstry, supra note 64, at 15-16 (noting that although states serve as
laboratories for environmental policy change and often serve as a template for federal
action, they face unique challenges).
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RGGI may serve this experimental function well. 194 Fo.r these reasons
the RGGI states should use every avenue available to them, including
the compensatory tax doctrine, to protect • the regulatory scheme
from invalidation based on the Interstate Commerce Clause. 195
The compensatory tax doctrine may not be accepted by a court
as applicable legal doctrine for emissions regulations because the
burden imposed is not in the form of a tax. 196
 As . the Supreme Court
noted in Oregon Waste, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the
State of Oregon, however, the compensatory tax doctrine is merely a
specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax that achieves a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondis-
criminatory means. 197 The RGGI states should therefore argue for the
expansion of compensatory tax doctrine principles to cover impor-
tant state and regional environmental regulations such as the RGGI
program. 198
A regulatory approach that adequately addresses leakage may
require a second regulation imposing a cap on the emissions associ-
ated with electricity imported into the region by LSEs.igg This regula-
tion would be passed after the implementation of the first cap on do-
mestic electricity generators and only if it was determined that
leakage was undermining the goals of the program.m If the RGGI
states decide to use this hybrid regulatory approach to address leak-
age, they should employ the compensatory tax doctrine to defend the
scheme by arguing that the regulation of imported electricity is neces-
sary to further a legitimate local purpose and that the combination of
the two regulations is nondiscriminatory in effect."' The purpose of
194 See M.J. Bradley & Associates, supra note 22, at 2; supra notes 1-8,18-22 and ac-
companying text. In addition, if California adopts a different program for reduction of
CO2 emissions from that adopted by RCCI, the impact of the two programs on the na-
tional regulated community could be significant and force federal action. See Mj. Bradley
& Associates, supra note 22, at 2; supra notes 1-8,18-22 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
197 See 511 U.S. 93,102 (1994).
198 See id; supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
. 199 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text..
200 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
291 See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325,342 (1996). There is an obvious distinc-
tion between a tax and a regulation limiting CO2 emissions. See supra note 107 and accom-
panying text. The emissions cap does, however, ultimately impose burdens on generators
of electricity that wish to participate in interstate commerce with the RGCI states. See supra
notes 57-66 and accompanying text. This burden on electricity crossing regional borders
is analogous to the burden imposed by the traditional taxes considered under the com-
pensatory tax doctrine. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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the initial emissions regulation imposed on generators is to reduce
CO2 emissions associated with in-state electricity consumption in or-
der to protect the state's interests in public health and welfare and
preservation of natural resources. 202 The regulation of imported elec-
tricity through LSEs is a compensatory measure designed simply to
make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate
comtrterce.203 In other words, the combination of the two regulations
merely levels the playing field across all electricity generators serving
the region.204 Because the LSE regulation is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the initial regulation, the combination of the two does
not have a discriminatory effect, and is therefore a legitimate com-
pensatory "tax" or burden on interstate commerce. 205
A. Application of the Compensatory Tax Doctrine to the Hybrid Approach
Under the first step of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a
court would likely determine that the second regulation imposed on
LSEs does not regulate evenhandedly with only incidental effects on
interstate commerce. 206 Rather, because the LSE regulation only regu-
lates emissions associated with electricity that crosses state lines while
exempting domestically generated electricity, a court would likely de-
2°2 See RGGI MoU, supra note I, at 1; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI,
http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
2°' See Assoc, Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,647 (1994).
2°4 See supra notes 43-63,99-102 and accompanying text.
205 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 330-31; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 99. One weakness of this argu-
ment is the availability of the total allocation-to-load regulatory option, which a court
could deem to be a reasonable, less discriminatory alternative. See supra note 56. Although
this regulation could still be subject to a Commerce Clause challenge because it places
burdens on interstate commerce of electricity, it likely would not face the strict scrutiny
test imposed on facially discriminatory regulations like the regulation that RGGI is now
considering. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. Rather, a court would likely
find that it regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce
because it does not differentiate between in-state and out-of-state interests. See CALIFORNIA
REPORT, supra note 3, at23 (noting that the total allocation-to-load approach generally
treats in-state and out-of-state interests equally); supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
A strong case could be made that a single load-based emissions cap that included both
domestic and imported energy would pass the Pike balancing test because: (I) it would
effectuate a legitimate local purpose—that of reducing greenhouse gases; (2) the burden
imposed on interstate commerce would not be clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits; and (3) there are no alternative means for promoting the local purpose as
well without discriminating against interstate commerce. See Pike v Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
206 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322,336 (1979).
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termine that the regulation of imported electricity discriminates
against interstate commerce on its face."
As noted above, courts review facially discriminatory regulations
under a strict scrutiny test based on the assumption that they are per
se invalid." To overcome this assumption, the proponent of the regu-
lation must show that the regulation advances a legitimate local pur-
pose that cannot adequately be served by reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives." This may be shown by applying the principles
embodied in the three prongs of the compensatory tax doctrine. 210
1. Application of the First Prong of the Compensatory Tax Doctrine:
Identifying the Intrastate Burden Requiring Compensation
Under the first prong of the compensatory tax doctrine, the RGGI
states must identify the intrastate burden for which the regulation of
emissions associated with electricity imports seeks to compensate. 211
 It is
reasonable to assume that a court would accept the assertion that the
states adopted the regulation in , good faith as compensation for the
domestic burden of the emission cap placed on in-state generators,
rather than suspecting some ulterior motive. 212 The states will also be
required to show that the intrastate burden serves some purpose for
which the state may otherwise impose a burden on interstate com-
merce. 213
One purpose of the intrastate burden on electricity generators is
to protect the RGGI states' natural resources and public health by re-
ducing CO2 emissions associated with electricity consumption. 214 The
"7 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333 (finding a statute that burdens interstate commerce but
not intrastate commerce to be facially discriminatory); On Waste, 511 U.S. at 100 (stating
that a law that taxes interstate activities more heavily is facially discriminatory); supra notes
56-63 and accompanying text; see also Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Chang in
the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENv-rt. L4. 54, 77-78 (2005) (concluding
that an outright ban on importation of electricity would be a facially discriminatory Com-
merce Clause violation unless it was expressly authorized by Congress).
233 See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
211 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 103.
212 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 337 (expressing suspicion that the reason given for imposing
an allegedly compensatory tax was illusory).
213 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981); see also Fulton, 516 U.S. at 334
(holding that North Carolina could not impose a tax on foreign corporations compensat-
ing for the burden of income tax on domestic corporations because North Carolina had
no sovereign interest in taxing the income of a foreign corporation).
2" See Rail MoU, supra note 1, at 1,
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RGGI states do not, however, have a sovereign interest in protecting
other states' natural resources or public health and safety, and no
court has yet held that a state has a legitimate interest in reducing
global pollutants outside its borders. 215 Therefore, a court could in-
validate the regulation because the intrastate burden that the genera-
tor regulation imposes serves a purpose for which the state may not
otherwise burden interstate commerce. 216 Similarly, the Court in
Maryland v. Louisiana rejected the argument that because the state
imposed a severance tax on gas extracted from its own soil, it could
impose a compensating first-use tax on imported gas. 217 The Court
held that Louisiana had no sovereign interest in the severance of re-
sources from land outside its borders, that the alleged compensating
tax was invalid, and that the state had to identify an in-state activity in
order to justify the first-use tax.218
The LSE regulation that the RGGI states may impose, however, is
unlike the Louisiana regulation in Louisiana because it is necessary to
promote the states' legitimate interest while the Louisiana regulation
was not. 219 In both Louisiana and Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, the Court
held that the state must identify an in-state activity or benefit to justify
the compensatory levy, a task that neither of the states could do. 22°
The RGGI states, on the other hand, may be able to overcome the
sovereign interest argument by showing that the regulation of emis-
sions associated with imported electricity is necessary to carry out the
purposes of the in-state regulation, and that the two regulations are
designed to meet the same end.221 The RGGI states should argue that
the combination of the two regulations serves the legitimate local in-
terest of protecting the natural resources and the health and welfare
215 See Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759; cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,54-56 (D.C. Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).111 Massachusetts v. EPA, judge Randolph, writing
for a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
assumed without deciding that a state has standing to bring an action based on the gener-
alized grievance of harms associated with global warming. 415 F.3d at 54-56. Judge Sen-
telie, dissenting in part but concurring in the judgment, stated that the state did not have
standing because it did not assert a specific harm associated with CO2 emissions. Id. at 59-
60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part but concurring in the judgment). Judge Tatel, dissent-
ing, stated that the state did have standing, in part because it had successfully shown injury
caused by global warming. Id. at 64 (Tate], J., dissenting).
215 See Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759.
217 See id.
218 See id.
215 See id. at 759; supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
225 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 334; Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759.
221 See Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759.
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of their citizens, and that a regulatory scheme that places some bur-
den on interstate commerce is necessary to effectuate that purpose. 222
If the states cannot regulate emissions from imported electricity, then
the regulation of domestic emissions will not be effective. 223 This ar-
gument thus directly addresses the requirement set out in Louisiana
that the two regulations be designed to meet the same end, because
both regulations are ultimately designed to protect the states' public
health and natural resources.224 Based on this reasoning, the RGGI
states could persuade a court that the regulation satisfies the first
prong of the compensatory tax doctrine. 225
2. Application of the Second PrOng of the Compensatory Tax
Doctrine: Equivalent Burdens on Interstate and Intrastate
Commerce
The second prong of the compensatory tax analysis requires that
the burden on interstate commerce roughly approximate, but not ex-
ceed, the burden on intrastate commerce. 226 The RGGI states will not
encounter the problems faced by states that sought to compensate for
burdens imposed on intrastate commerce by general forms of taxa-
tion as Oregon did in Oregon. Waste and North Carolina did in Fulton,
because the LSE regulation compensates for a specific regulation fo-
cused on emissions from fossil fuel-fired generators, rather than a
generally applicable resident taxation. 227 The complexity of the ac-
counting in the case of emissions trading, however, is sure to raise its
own challenges. 228
It is well-established that pure economic protectionism is not
considered a legitimate local purpose under Commerce Clause juris-
222 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (upholding a facially discrimina-
tory law banning the importation of out-of-state bait fish into Maine because the fish were
subject to parasites completely foreign to Maine baitfish and could jeopardize the health
of the Maine fish population, and no nondiscriminatory alternatives existed).
225 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
224 See Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759.
225 See supra notes 211-224 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 141-145, 165-171 and accompanying text.
227 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 104-05; supra notes 141-145, 165-
171 and accompanying text.
228 See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643 (1984) (striking down an allegedly
compensatory tax, in part because the court could not determine which part of the tax was
meant to be compensatory); CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, 23 (discussing the
current lack of a robust emissions-tracking system for LSEs); see also Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338;
On Waste, 511 U.S. at 104-05.
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prudence. 229 Therefore, if a regulation had the effect of putting in-
state generators at a competitive advantage over out-of-state genera-
tors, that regulation would be struck down.239 It is therefore critical
that the RGGI states consider this issue from the beginning of the
program if they intend to address the problem of leakage in the fu-
ture.231 Even under a regulatory scheme that only targets domestic
generators, the RGGI states should set the initial cap on emissions for
the region at a level that includes the emissions associated with his-
toric imports on the same basis as historic in-region generation. 232
Under the second regulation, LSEs should receive allowance alloca-
tions on the same basis that generators are given allowances." 3 Any
inequality in the method by which allowances are distributed to LSEs
for their imports as compared to domestic generators could lead a
court to detect economic protectionistn. 234 The RGGI states must be
able to show that the allocation of allowances to imported electricity
under the second regulatory measure is nondiscriminatory because it
is based on the same historic baseline as the allocation of allowances
to domestic generators. 233
Also critical to the defense of the regulation on imported elec-
tricity will be the method by which actual emissions associated with
imported electricity and domestic generator emissions will be meas-
ured.236 If the methods used are not the same, then the states will run
a greater risk of having the regulation of imported electricity struck
down, because the court will not be able to weigh the burdens quanti-
2'2g See O Waste, 511 U.S. at 106 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454
(1992) and New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275 (1988)); Henneford v.
Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937).
23° See On Waste, 511 U.S. at 106; Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 586.
231 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-23. Because the initial phase of the
program will only regulate in-region generators, the RGGI states must determine how to
allocate the allowances associated with historic imports so as to avoid allocation problems
later in the event that the regulation of imported electricity is required. See id. If the RGGI
states allocate the entire cap of allowances including those associated with historic imports
to generators during the initial phase of the program and leakage becomes a problem,
then there will be the serious issue of reallocating those allowances associated with historic
imports to the newly regulated LSEs. See id.; cf. Armco, 467 U.S. at 645 (rejecting an alleg-
edly compensatory tax in part because it was unclear which part of the tax was intended to
be compensatory).
232 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
233 See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23; Cowart, supra note 7, at 5.
234 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 109-05.
233 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 109-05.
23°
	 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 109-05.
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tatively.237 For example, if the states use actual emission rates for in-
state generators because they are able to inspect those plants, but use
assumed rates based on megawatt-hour output for imported electricity
because they arc unable to inspect out-of-state plants, a court could
find that either the burdens were not equivalent or that it was too
cumbersome to attempt to weigh them.238 For this reason, RGGI
should use a common system of assigning CO2 attributes to electricity
for both generators and LSEs. 239
Both the allocation of allowances and measurement of emissions
will likely raise the sort of difficult quantitative questions that the Su-
preme Court has continually used to strike down compensatory regu-
lations.24° For example, in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, the state attempted
to impose a wholesale interstate tax to compensate for a manufactur-
ing intrastate tax. 241 The Court complained that it could not deter-
mine what part of the manufacturing tax was attributable to manufac-
turing and what part to sales and therefore it struck down the burden
on interstate commerce, even though the burden on intrastate activi-
ties was arguably the greater of the two. 242 To survive the second
prong of the analysis, the RGGI states must ensure that the account-
ing of allowances and emissions reveals the actual burdens imposed
and that the burden on interstate commerce is no greater than the
burden on intrastate commerce. 243
3. Application of the Third Prong of the Compensatory Tax Doctrine;
Substantially Equivalent Events
Under the third prong of the compensatory tax doctrine, the
RGGI states would be required to show that the events on which the
237 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342; Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 105; Armco, 467 U.S. at 643.
23' See Armco, 467 U.S. at 643 (striking clown an allegedly compensatory tax in part be-
cause the court could not determine what portion of the tax compensated for the in-state
burden); CALIFORNIA REPORT, Supra ['IOW 3, at 23 (noting the various difficulties associated
with tracking emissions).
239 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342; Or Waste, 511 U.S. at 105; Armco, 467 U.S. at 643. There
is currently not a robust tracking system for LSEs to monitor emissions associated with
electricity they deliver to customers. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. Options
for developing a tracking system include relying on average emissions and requiring power
contracts to include emissions data for electricity delivered. ld.
240 See supra notes 129,142-144,168-171 and accompanying text.
241 See 467 U.S. at 643.
242 See Armco, 467 U.S. at 643; see also Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 104-05 (refusing to engage
in the type of quantitative assessments that the compensatory tax doctrine requires).
243 See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 584; see also Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342; On Waste, 511 U.S. at
105; Armco, 467 U.S. at 643.
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interstate and intrastate burdens fall are substantially equivalent; that
is, they are sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclu-
sive proxies for each other. 244 The states should be able to show that
emissions associated with imported electricity and emissions from
domestically generated electricity serve as mutually exclusive proxies
for each other because they are functionally equivalent. 245 In Louisi-
ana, the Court held that severance of natural gas and import of gas
into the state for "use" were not comparable and no equality existed
because the state was not ensuring uniform treatment of goods and
materials to be consumed in the state. 246 Instead, goods were bur-
dened differently depending on whether or not they were destined
for interstate commerce. 247 By contrast, in the case of the regulations
imposed on LSEs and in-state generators, the states are attempting to
impose a burden on imported electricity equivalent to the burden on
domestic electricity to ensure uniform treatment of electricity con-
sumed in the state. 248 This treatment is unlike that in Louisiana, but
similar to that in Henneford v. Silas Mason, where the Court upheld the
combination of the sales and use taxes because the regulations en-
sured uniform treatment of goods and the burden was imposed
equally on residents and non-residents making use of goods within
the state.249
Moreover, the burden of the two regulations falls on the same
class of actors—either all generators selling to the state whether resi-
dent or non-resident, or ultimately on all consumers within the
state—and thus the regulations are functionally equivalent. 250 This is
similar to the Court's reasoning in Hinson v. Lott, where it upheld a
tax on each gallon of liquor imported into the state on the ground
that it complemented a tax of equal magnitude on each gallon of liq-
uor distilled in the state and was necessary to equalize competition
between in-staters and out-of-staters. 251 Here, as in Hinson, the two
"taxes" are functionally equivalent and therefore the two events serve
as mutually exclusive proxies for each other.252 The hybrid scheme is
244 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332-33.
245 See id.
246 See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
249 See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 584; cf. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 725.
280 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 339-40.
251 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text; see also Fulton, 516 U.S. at 339; On
Waste, 511 U.S. at 103.
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unlike the scheme in Fulton, where the Court expressly found that the
actual incidence of the burdens due to the corporate income tax and
the intangibles tax fell on differently described taxpayers. 253 The Court
concluded that because one tax fell on domestic corporations while
the other fell on individuals investing in out-of-state corporations, the
two could not be functionally equivalent and the discriminatory regu-
lation was invalid. 254 By contrast, the burdens of the two regulations
here fall on similarly described entities, those serving a state's electric-
ity market and ultimately consumers within the state, and therefore
the two burdens are functionally'equivalent. 255
As sensible as this argument seems, the fact remains that the Su-
preme Court has continuously refused to acknowledge any expansion
of the compensatory tax doctrine beyond the sales and use tax cate-
gory since its 1937 decision in Silas Mason. 256
 For example, in Armco
the Court held that manufacturing and wholesale are not substantially
similar events, reasoning that the taxes imposed on the two were not
functionally equivalent to each other. 257 The Court in Fulton stated:
"Hinson does not alter our conclusion today that Courts will ordinarily
be unable to evaluate the economic equivalence of allegedly comple-
mentary tax schemes that go beyond traditional sales/use taxes." 258 It
appears that the Court is largely unwilling to open the door to allow-
ing facially discriminatory regulations as alleged compensatory regu-
lations outside sales and use taxes because the quantitative evaluations
required to determine whether the burdens are equivalent are too
cumbersome. 259 The principles embodied in the doctrine, however,
are still of value to the RGGI states because they may form the foun-
dation of an argument for upholding the regulation. 26°
For one, there is a critical distinction between the hybrid ap-
proach to regulating emissions and each of the allegedly compensa-
tory taxes that the Court has struck down since Silas Mason.261 In every
other case the Court has found that the combination of regulations
either did in effect, or had the potential to, favor domestic interests
255 See supra notes 173-189 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 173-189 and accompanying text..
255 See supra notes 173-189 and accompanying text; see also Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 584.
256 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338 (emphasizing the Court's reluctance to extend the com-
pensatory tax doctrine beyond the context of sales and use taxes).
257 See supra notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
268
 Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342 n.8.
256
 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 342; On Waste, 511 U.S. at 105; Armco, 467 U.S. at 643.
260 See supra notes 210-255 and accompanying text.
261 See infra notes 262-266 and accompanying text.
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over out-of-staters. 262 By contrast, here it is assumed that the RGGI
states will design a combination of regulations that do not favor do-
mestically generated electricity over imported electricity. 265 In Louisi-
ana, the combined effect of the imposed tax and tax credit scheme
was to burden only gas traveling out of state; therefore, the tax was
invalidated. 2" In Fulton, the regulations had the effect of encouraging
North Carolinians to invest in domestic rather than out-of-state com-
panies. 265 By contrast, as was the case in Silas Mason, the RGGI regula-
tions would have the effect of burdening all electricity consumed in
the state equally and therefore should be upheld. 266
It is also worth considering the words of the Court in Armco when
evaluating the manufacturing and wholesale taxes. 267 The Court
noted that because no exception existed in the regulation for im-
ported goods already subject to manufacturing tax in another state,
the combination of the two regulations could have the effect of favor-
ing domestic goods.268 If out-of-state generators are subject to emis-
sions caps in their home states, then the LSE regulation will not fur-
ther burden them because they will already be producing clean
electricity and the regulation will not run into the Armco problem.269
Before implementing a hybrid approach, however, the RGGI states
must consider whether the regulation on imported electricity requires
some exceptions.270 For example, the regulation should account for
other potential burdens associated with CO 2 emissions that are not
imposed in the RGGI region but could be imposed in other states,
such as CO 2 emissions taxes. 271 Taking this issue into account as well
as the Court's approach to compensatory taxes, the RGGI states may
be able to avoid invalidation of future attempts to address leakage. 272
262 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 343; Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 106; Armco, 967 U.S. at 644; Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. at 759.
262 See supra notes 226-243 and accompanying text.
264 See Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759.
265 See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 343.
266 See Silas Mason, 75 U.S. at 159-55; supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.




271 See id.; supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 206-266 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate solution to the problem of leakage is to implement
a nationwide regulatory program for greenhouse gas emissions. Until
that time, state regulators must do their best to combat global warm-
ing by implementing regional programs and to prevent leakage. If
RGGI is committed to a supply-side regulatory scheme, there are sev-
eral factors that should be considered before implementing a regula-
tion that covers imported electricity through LSEs. In order to meet
the requirements of the compensatory tax doctrine, the RGGI states
must be able to show with absolute certainty that the combined effect
of the regulations is to impose equal burdens on electricity to be con-
sumed within the state—that the burden on interstate commerce is
no greater than the burden on intrastate commerce.
The initial carbon dioxide emissions cap should be set at levels
that include emissions associated with historic imports as well as his-
toric in-state generation, to avoid difficult accounting of allowances in
the second phase of the program. The RGGI states must also deter-
mine how to allocate allowances associated with historic imports dur-
ing the phase of the program that only subjects in-state generators to
regulation. The allocation of allowances must not favor in-state elec-
tricity generators.
The RGGI states must also ,determine how carbon emission at-
tributes of imported electricity should be measured. The method
used should be the same as the method used for measuring emissions
associated with domestically generated electricity, to avoid any differ-
ential treatment of in-state and out-of-state generators that could in-
validate the regulation.
Even if these precautions are taken by the RGGI states, there is
still a substantial likelihood that a court would strike down the regula-
tion of imported electricity through in-state LSEs as a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Faced with such a challenge, RGGI states
should argue that the principles embodied in the compensatory tax
doctrine should be applied to validate the regulatory scheme, because
the scheme achieves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
achieved through nondiscriminatory means. First, the regulation of
imported electricity compensates for the domestic burden caused by
the emission cap placed on in-state generators. Second, the regulatory
scheme places equal burdens on both in-state and out-of-state actors
by placing them on equal footing with regard to emissions allowances.
Third, the emissions associated with imported electricity and emis-
sions from domestically-generated electricity serve as mutually exclu-
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sive proxies for each other. A court reviewing the hybrid regulatory
scheme should accordingly extend the applicability of this dormant
Commerce Clause exception.
In the event that the RGGI program merely regulates in-region
generators and does not address the problem of leakage, the program
will still be a valuable tool. The action of the RGGI states, in combina-
tion with actions taken in other states such as California, may be the
catalyst required to set a national movement in motion. At the very
least, the RGGI program will inform other regulators around the
country of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential pitfalls of a cap-
and-trade program for regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
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